The impacts of a community forestry program on forest conditions, management intensity and revenue generation in the Dang district of Nepal by POUDEL Narayan Raj et al.
  
 
 
GRIPS Discussion Paper 13-24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The impacts of a community forestry program on forest conditions, 
management intensity and revenue generation in the Dang district of 
Nepal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Narayan Rajpoudel 
Nobuhiko Fuwa 
Keijiro Otsuka 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies 
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, 
Tokyo, Japan 106-8677 
1 
 
The impacts of a community forestry program on 
forest conditions, management intensity and 
revenue generation in the Dang district of Nepal 
 
NARAYAN RAJ POUDEL 
Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, 
1-21-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0054, Japan. 
Email: mnkpoudel@yahoo.com 
 
NOBUHIKO FUWA 
Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, 
1-21-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0054, Japan. 
Email: nfuwa@waseda.jp 
 
KEIJIRO OTSUKA 
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 7-22-1 Roppongi, 
Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-8677, Japan 
Tel: +81-3-6439-6228 
Email: Otsuka@grips.ac.jp 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted 30 July 2013 
 
2 
 
ABSTRACT. A growing literature documents the positive impact of community management on 
non-timber forest conservation, but not on the management of timber forests which require higher 
management intensity than do non-timber forests.  We find in Nepal that better market access 
encourages felling of mature timber trees before but not after the community management began 
and that population pressure leads to deforestation, which would have taken place under 
government management, but encourages forest management in recent years under community 
management. Longer period of community management is found to be associated with the higher 
density of larger trees, indicating that the community management facilitates rehabilitation of 
timber forests.  
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1. Introduction 
Forests are being depleted at an alarming rate in recent decades in developing countries 
(World Bank, 2009). The depletion of forest resources is most likely to occur in state-
managed forests because the capacity of and incentives for the governments to protect and 
manage forests are limited (Somanathan, 1991; Ostrom, 1990; Jodha, 2001). Responding to 
this problem, various forest management systems have been practiced to manage forest 
resources.
 
Among these systems, the community forest management system has become 
popular in recent decades, particularly in developing countries (Baland et al., 2010; 
Tachibana et al., 2001).   
Hayami (2009) argues that the community has an inherent informal mechanism that 
can serve as an effective system to enforce collective action among community members. 
This is because information asymmetry is not so serious within the community, where 
everyone knows everybody else. Since forest resources are non-excludable to a 
considerable extent, however, people may extract resources excessively under community 
management, which may lead to "the tragedy of the commons," as described by Hardin 
(1968). To address this, secure use rights on natural resources can be provided to the 
community groups which may have incentives to protect and manage forests effectively 
(Gerald et al., 2001). Realizing this, the community management system, in which the use 
rights are handed over to community groups, has been practiced in recent decades 
worldwide. The community management system is considered as an institutional 
innovation which empowers local people to manage forests for better livelihoods and forest 
conditions (Ojha et al., 2009). Further, the community management system can be a 
superior alternative to the individualized management system in the protection of common 
forest resources (Kijima et al., 2000; Bromley and Chapagain, 1984). In fact, there has 
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emerged a flourishing literature reporting the success of the community management 
system where the major forest management issue is how to prevent excessive exploitation 
of forest resources (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991; Tachibana et al., 2001; Ostrom, 1990, 
Bromley, 1992).  
 However, a question arises as to whether the community forest management system 
can work where high valued timber trees dominate. The literature is weak in the analysis of 
timber forest management, as distinct from that of copse forests, under the community 
management system. This is problematic because the production of valuable timber trees 
requires labor for silvicultural operations, unlike the production of non-timber products 
which usually does not require much labor for care of trees. In addition, the limited existing 
literature is subjected to methodological criticism such as the lack of rigorous econometric 
analysis (e.g., Chakraborty, 2001; Nagendra, 2001), the subjective judgment of the forest 
condition (e.g., Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006), the lack of ground level data (e.g., Bhattarai 
and Conway, 2008), and the endogenous choice of management regime not being properly 
taken into account in explaining the forest condition.
1
  
 The main purpose of this study, therefore, is to conduct a rigorous econometric 
analysis of the management of timber forests with special reference to the impact of the 
hand-over of forest use rights to the community. More specifically, using the community 
forest level data from the Tarai region of Nepal, where forests used to be largely open 
access under government management but are more effectively managed at present under 
community management, this study attempts to contribute to the current understanding of 
forest management on three issues. First, it explores the determinants of deforestation and 
                                                          
1 Edmonds (2002) and Tachibana and Adhikari (2009) are a few notable exceptions in 
terms of methodological rigor. 
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forest degradation, which would have taken place under government management. Second, 
it investigates the determinants of forest management intensity and revenue generation at 
present under community management. Third, it attempts to identify the effects of the 
community forest management system on reforestation by examining the effect of the 
length of community management on the density of small and medium-sized trees. We 
hypothesize that when the forest was managed by the state, population pressure created a 
higher demand for firewood, and agricultural and grazing land, which resulted in 
deforestation, whereas favorable market access led to the felling of large trees for sale. 
However, once the forest use rights were handed over to the community forest user groups, 
the larger the demand for forest resources, the greater became the incentives to manage the 
forests, thereby leading to faster rehabilitation of the forest condition through the 
regeneration of young trees.  
 Based on a rigorous econometric analysis using the ground level data of the forest 
conditions, our empirical results support these hypotheses. Our strategy for identifying the 
impact of community management on forest conditions with cross-section data rests on two 
factors. First, this paper is among the few studies utilizing ground level data on forest 
conditions.
2
 A snapshot information on the density of trees of different sizes can allow us 
to infer the changes over the recent decade that are likely to have occurred in the forest. 
Secondly, we exploit the fact that the year when forest use rights were handed over to 
community groups differs across community forests, which creates variations in the 
number of years when those community forests had been under community management at 
                                                          
2 Baland et al. (2010), Tachibana and Adhikari (2009) and Gautam (2009) are notable 
exceptions in this regard.  
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the time of our data collection. We identify the impact of community management by 
correlating the forest conditions with the length of exposure to community management. 
Since the timing of hand over is likely to be correlated with unobserved characteristics of 
communities, however, we treat the timing of hand over as an endogenous variable in our 
analysis.   
 This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss the evolution of 
community forestry in Nepal. In section 3, we briefly explain the main issues and 
hypotheses of the study. In section 4, we discuss the data and methodology used in the 
analysis. In section 5, we report the estimation results and their interpretations. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2.  Evolution of community forestry 
Forest management issues occupy a central place in the national policy discourse in Nepal 
because of their importance in the livelihoods of the people and in the state revenue (Ojha, 
2009). Historically, local governments controlled the forest resources in the feudal Rana 
regime from 1846 to 1950. They undertook the harvesting of timber trees, particularly in 
the Tarai region and in some parts of the hill region accessible to markets, but the 
collection of minor forest products was unregulated (Tachibana et al., 2001). After the 
collapse of the Rana regime in 1950, its feudal forest management system also collapsed, 
resulting in massive deforestation and forest degradation. Responding to this situation, all 
the forest areas were nationalized in 1957. However, the government could not manage the 
forests effectively. Observing the effective and voluntary management of forests by 
communities in selected areas in the 1960s and 1970s, the government of Nepal gradually 
realized the importance of a decentralized management system to arrest deforestation and 
forest degradation.  
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Following the recommendation of the Ninth Forestry Conference in 1974, the 
government of Nepal drafted a National Forestry Plan to combat deforestation and forest 
degradation. For the first time, the plan officially recognized the role of local people in 
forest management activities (Pokharel, 1997). In response to this plan, the government 
enacted Panchayat Forest Rules and Panchayat-Protected Forest Rules in 1978, which 
allowed the locally elected body called the village Panchayat to manage the degraded 
forestland. The Decentralization Act in 1982 introduced the 'user group' concept and 
promoted it as an effective means to combat the deterioration of the stock of forest 
resources. Another landmark development in community forestry was the preparation of 
the 25-year master plan in 1988, which emphasized the importance of forest user groups to 
revitalize the age-long indigenous practices of forest resource management.  
After the restoration of the democratic system in 1990, the Nepalese government 
enacted the new Forest Act in 1993 and Forest Regulations in 1995 for the proper 
management of forests. The Act and Regulations placed high priority on the community 
forestry program. The new forest rule specifies a procedure for the formation of community 
forest user groups (CFUGs) and identifies them as self-governed autonomous entities 
(Gautam et al., 2004). The second amendment of the community forest development 
guidelines in 2005 focuses more clearly on the rights of the poor and outlines the detailed 
roles of forest stakeholders such as foresters and CFUGs. The handing-over process of the 
forest use rights from the government to the local community begins with a discussion 
between the local forest users and the local forest officers. A general assembly meeting of 
the villagers must be held where the forest user group committee (FUGC) members are 
elected. Foresters help to organize the assembly and FUGC to prepare a constitution and an 
Operational Plan (OP) describing the detailed forest management plan for the coming 5-
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year period. Then, CFUGs submit these documents to the District Forest Office (DFO), and 
if all the requirements are fulfilled, the DFO hands over the forest use rights to the CFUGs.  
In recent decades, the community forest management system has become popular in 
Nepal. About 1.6 million people participate in the community forestry programs, and about 
one and a half million hectares of forest have been handed over to the communities 
nationwide (Ojha, 2009). It is widely accepted that the community forestry program has 
been successful in enriching the forest conditions in the Hill region of the country. 
However, there has been a genuine dispute regarding the prospect of the success of 
community timber forestry in the Tarai region.   
 
3. Issues and hypotheses 
3.1. Deforestation and forest degradation before the handover  
Given the importance of halting deforestation and forest degradation in Nepal, various 
forest management systems have been implemented. However, the depletion of forest 
resources has not stopped yet. Many studies have attempted to identify the factors 
associated with deforestation and forest degradation processes. Often documented are the 
extension and expansion of roads, agriculture expansion, and population pressure on the 
use of forest resources, among other things. Most studies are based on satellite imagery 
showing forest conditions (e.g., Nagendra, 2001; Kanel and Niraula, 2004). Studies using 
ground level data of the forest conditions and management practices under the community 
management regime have seldom been carried out.  
 According to the Department of Forest and Research Survey (1999), forest covers 
about 40% of the total land area of the country, and the forest area per capita is 0.27 ha in 
Nepal. The forest area had decreased at an annual rate of 1.7 % during the period from 
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1978/79 to 1994. The latest survey conducted in 20 Tarai districts of Nepal finds that forest 
cover had decreased at an annual rate of 0.06% in the 1990s (Ministry of Forests and Soil 
Conservation, 2009).  
 The population of the Tarai region of Nepal has been increasing due primarily to 
out-migration from the Hill and the Mountain regions over the last several decades. 
According to Regmi (1994), the push factors of migration from the Hill to Tarai region are 
population pressure, insufficient food production, deteriorating environmental conditions, 
natural calamities, and the lack of employment opportunities. Pull factors are better 
transportation facilities, greater availability of food, health services, and schooling systems, 
and higher agricultural wages. Improved road access in Tarai also helps stimulate the 
migration process and offers good market access for forest products (World Bank, 2007).
3
  
 State managed forests tend to be degraded severely because they are loosely 
managed or de facto open access. If so, higher population pressure and better market access 
would have accelerated the rate of deforestation and forest degradation due to the higher 
demand for forest products (e.g., timber, firewood, and fodder grasses) and forest land (e.g., 
for agricultural and settlement purposes). If the purpose of felling mature timber trees is the 
sale at the market, it is likely that large trees were felled in forests with favorable access to 
markets. Based on these arguments, we postulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Higher population pressure leads to deforestation by clearing the forest for 
the expansion of agricultural land and settlement area as well as by excessive grazing, 
while better access to market leads to forest degradation due to the loss of large trees for 
logging and selling.   
                                                          
3 In line with this, Liu et al. (1993) find negative relationships between distance to roads 
and the loss of forest cover in the Philippines. 
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 In this study, the population pressure is measured by the number of households per 
unit area of the community forest area, and the market access is proxied by the distance to 
the main road. We attempt to test whether this hypothesis holds under state management by 
examining the associations between the estimated proportion of deforested area at the time 
of handover and population density, and between the current volume of large trees per unit 
of area (at the time of survey) and distance to road. The deforested area that would have 
been observed at the time of handover is estimated by adding the tree planted area, barren 
area and encroached area because timber forests in the Tarai region have the capacity to 
regenerate trees unless they are severely damaged.  The fact that trees were artificially 
planted in certain parts of forest implies that forest lost capacity to regenerate trees in such 
parts due to complete eradication of trees.  
3.2. Forest management operation after the handover  
Community forest management refers to the use and management of forest resources by the 
local people living in and around the forest area who are integrated ecologically, socially, 
and culturally. Forest management operations are needed to maintain and improve the 
forest condition. The activities of the forest management operations include: i) protecting 
the forest from over-exploitation, ii) improving the forest condition by weeding, pruning, 
thinning, planting, and singling, and iii) harvesting the forest products (Malla et al., 2001). 
Community forest user group members are supposed to obey the rule of restricted forest 
resource extraction, participate in various silvicultural operations, and receive benefits 
accrued from community projects funded by the sale revenue of forest resources and the 
privilege of purchasing firewood, timber, and other forest resources at prices lower than 
market prices. Forest management begins with the planning process, in which every CFUG 
needs to prepare an OP through a participatory approach, which directs the way in which 
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the forest is managed for the next operational plan period (usually 5 years). The plan must 
contain information on the objective of the forest management, forest condition/inventory, 
forest protection and development activities, provisions for income generation and 
expenses, penalties, and plantation activities (Forest Act 1993 and Regulation 1995). 
Specifically, forest protection, silvicultural operations and harvesting, a regeneration 
strategy, and income generation are the issues of primary concern in the community forest 
management.  
 Effective forest protection requires the prevention of grazing, encroachment, and 
illicit harvesting. To ensure the sustainability, the regeneration of new plants is necessary 
after harvesting mature trees. Regeneration can take place through various ways such as 
new growth from the existing rootstock, plantation, and natural seedling. Plantation is 
needed if the forest is completely destroyed and self-regeneration of the new trees is not 
possible. If we plant the new trees in the barren forests, it will significantly reduce the 
pressure on natural trees in areas where fuelwood collection is a major cause for 
deforestation (Kohlin and Parks, 2001). Silvicultural operations such as weeding, pruning, 
thinning, and singling are needed to improve the timber forest condition and the quality of 
timber. Such operations not only stimulate the growth of high-quality timber trees but also 
supply minor forest products for the forest users. We hypothesize that higher population 
density and better market access accelerate deforestation and forest degradation, if forest is 
de facto open access under government management, but stimulate the forest management 
if its use right is handed over to the community. This is because higher population density 
and better market access create higher demand for forest resources, which would result in 
excessive exploitation of forest resources if nobody owns them but would provide the 
incentives for the forest users to manage the forests collectively if use rights are handed 
12 
 
over to them. In other words, the benefits of collective management would be larger when 
the demand for the forest products is greater. 
 CFUGs generate income from various sources such as the sale of forest products 
and membership fees (Kanel and Niraula, 2004). The sustainable generation of revenue 
from the forest resources has a number of synergetic effects on forest conditions and 
livelihood improvement of the people (Gautam et al., 2004; Bampton et al., 2004; Kanel 
and Niraula,, 2004; Kanel, 2004). For example, if they generate enough revenue, they can 
spend such revenues on forest management, poverty reduction and social development 
activities (e.g., making fences along forest boundaries, financing pro-poor program and 
constructing school buildings and village trails). Jumbe and Anglsen (2006) find that 
community forestry program protects poor households from extreme poverty. Many other 
studies have been conducted to explore the income generation and utilization pattern by the 
CFUGs (e.g., Pokharel, 2009; Khanal Chettri et al., 2009). Based on the data from three 
Hill districts, Pokharel (2009) finds that three-quarters of the income of CFUGs comes 
from forestry sources, of which timber alone contributes about 68 percent of the total 
income. Khanal Chettri et al. (2009) find that income generation by the community groups 
depends on the forest area, forest quality, species composition, and market access. They 
also confirm that CFUGs with higher income tend to spend it in local development 
activities. While most of these studies focus on the Hill forests, studies exploring the 
determinants of revenue collection have seldom been conducted in the Tarai region of 
Nepal. 
 We expect that CFUGs carrying out intensive management operations also extract 
more forest products in a sustainable manner, resulting in more revenue per unit of forest 
area. Based on these arguments, we postulate the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2:  Higher population density and better market access not only lead to more 
intensive management of community forests but also help to generate more revenue per 
unit area after the forest use rights are handed over.  
 We test this hypothesis by examining the association between population pressure 
measured by the number of households per unit of forest area and the intensity of forest 
management, and between population pressure and the amount of revenue generation per 
unit area. The intensity of forest management is measured by the percentage of managed 
forest area during the last 5 years from the time of data collection, and revenue per unit 
area is measured by the revenue generation per hectare of forest area by the CFUGs in the 
fiscal year 2009/2010. 
3.3. Impact of community forestry on reforestation  
Reforestation is one of the main objectives of the community forest management,
4
 which 
contributes to maintaining forest conditions sustainably and rehabilitating the damaged 
forests. Therefore, the extent of reforestation is a good indicator to measure the success of 
initiating the community forestry with the devolution of forest use rights to the community. 
  The success of the community forest management system in revitalizing forest 
conditions has been well documented in the Hill region of Nepal (Acharya, 2005; Dev et al., 
2003; Tachibana and Adhikari, 2009; Yadav et al., 2003). However, the literature on 
reforestation is relatively scanty in the case of the Tarai region. Forests in the Hill region 
are copse forests, which require protection but not much silvicultural operations for 
reforestation. In contrast, forests in the Tarai region are timber forests which require both 
protection and silvicultural operations to produce valuable timber trees (Tachibana et al., 
                                                          
4 Other main objectives of community forestry programs include forest conservation and 
the livelihood improvement of the poor. 
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2001). To carry out silvicultural operations properly, work incentives are critically 
important, and whether community management succeeds in the silvicultural operations by 
organizing collective work is an important empirical question.  
 The possession of forest use rights helps strengthen the incentives for the 
community participation in the resource management by assuring their rights to receive the 
generated benefits (Aggarwal and Elbow, 2006). Therefore, handing over the forest use 
rights is expected to encourage the local people to protect forests and improve their 
condition. While conducting the survey, we observed a large number of small and medium-
size trees growing in our research sites. Based on such an observation, we postulate the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Community forest management has positive impacts on reforestation after 
the use right is handed over to the local community.  
 To test this hypothesis, we use the average number of small and pole trees per unit 
of forest area as proxy measures for the extent of reforestation. We expect that if the forests 
are managed intensively, pole trees are abundant in the forests handed over relatively early, 
and small size trees are dominant in the forests handed over recently.  
 
4. Data and estimation method  
Our dataset comes from the community forestry program in the Dang district which is 
located in the Inner Tarai region of Nepal.
5
 The Dang district is recognized as a pioneer 
district in initiating community forestry in the Tarai region of Nepal. In this district, some 
communities have resumed timber forest management informally since around 1980 
                                                          
5 The forest quality and tree composition in the Dang district are similar to the other part of 
the Tarai region.  
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(Sakurai et al., 2004). Given the similarity in the forest quality and tree composition 
between the Dang district and other districts in the region, the forests in the Dang district 
can be considered as representative of the Tarai region.  
 The area of this district is nearly 296 thousand hectares, of which about 66 percent 
of the area is covered by forest. The elevation of the Dang district ranges from 213 meters 
to 2,058 meters from sea level. The district has a subtropical monsoonal climate in the 
lowland and a temperate climate in the highland. Loam and clay soils can be found in the 
valleys, whereas rock, slates, and mixed soil are found in the hill area. Most of the forests 
in the Dang district are dominated by hard wood trees such as Sal trees except in some 
places in the hill sides. The use rights of the majority of accessible forests have been 
already handed over to local communities. 
Among the 447 registered CFUGs as of 2010 in the District Forest Office (DFO) of 
Dang, 200 were randomly selected excluding the planted forests and those registered later 
than 2005. Planted forests were excluded because the management of these forests is 
qualitatively different from Sal-based natural forests. Recently registered CFUGs were 
excluded because they were considered to be too new to assess the impacts of handing over 
on the forest conditions. Relevant data were collected from primary and secondary sources. 
The secondary sources are the constitutions and operation plans of the CFUGs,
6 which they 
have to submit to the district forest office. We used the data on the forest conditions 
                                                          
6 Every community group has to submit its constitution at the time of the handover, but 
they can be revised later. The constitution contains information about the number of user 
households, functions, duties and power of the user group and user group committee, and 
financial regulations. The CFUG must submit the operational plan at a regular interval of 
usually 5 years. This report contains information about the objective of the forest 
management, forest development activities that have to be carried out in the plan period, 
forest characteristics such as the number of trees in the forest by size and type, slope, soil 
type and so on. The operational plan is prepared by the CFUG with the technical support of 
the district forest office. 
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reported by the operation plan which was originally collected in association with forestry 
technicians using a standard forestry approach. The number and volume of the different 
sizes of trees per unit area are used to measure the forest condition. Besides these, other 
information such as silvicultural activities in terms of the area covered in the last 5 years, 
revenue generation in the last one year, and deforested area was collected by our own 
survey based on interviews with the forest user committee members (the data are available 
upon request). 
 Our survey collected the data on the extent of deforestation by asking the newly 
planted area, the area of barren land, and the area of encroachment for agriculture and 
human settlement purposes. According to our respondents, severe deforestation took place 
almost exclusively before forests were handed over. As mentioned earlier, the Sal (Shorea 
robusta) tree is dominant in the forests, and it has high regenerative capacity, so that unless 
trees are completely uprooted or heavily grazed, regeneration takes place. Therefore, we 
can interpret all the areas of community forest which are barren, planted artificially, and 
encroached upon as the areas that were severely degraded at least once due to the complete 
felling of trees and heavy animal grazing. We thus use “barren, planted and encroached 
areas” as our proxy measure for the extent of deforestation under state management. After 
the hand-over of the use rights, some parts of the barren area have been planted to fast 
growing trees by CFUGs. We should note, however, that this measure is likely to 
underestimate the deforested area, because the regeneration of trees could have taken place 
gradually on deforested area over time, if they are surrounded by Sal trees, which is not 
counted as deforested area in our measure of deforestation.  
 The second type of indicators of the forest condition includes (i) the average 
number of trees per hectare belonging to different diameter classes and (ii) tree volumes 
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per hectare. We categorize the trees into three distinctive groups. Trees less than 10 cm 
diameter at breast-height are classified as small trees; trees between 10 cm to 30 cm 
diameter are classified as pole size trees; and trees greater than 30 cm diameter are 
classified as mature trees. In our empirical analyses, we assume that a larger number of 
small and pole size trees per hectare is an indication that reforestation is taking place, for 
the following reasons. Roughly speaking, mature trees are at least older than 20 years. 
Since the average time elapsed since the forest was handed over in our sample is about 12 
years, the presence of large size trees in the community managed forests cannot be a result 
of reforestation after the handover. Rather, it is more reasonable to assume that those large 
trees have been protected since the period before the handover, and thus this part of the 
forest was intact even before the hand-over. In contrast, the presence of small and pole size 
trees (i.e., trees of age younger than 20 years) can be interpreted as a result of recent 
regeneration. For mature trees, data are also available in volume, which is a better measure 
of biomass than the number of trees.  
 To measure the intensity of forest management in recent years, we collected the 
data on the total area of the forest where the community forest user members carried out 
silvicultural operations during the past 5-year period before the year of data collection (e.g., 
from 2005 to 2009). Silvicultural operations comprise weeding, singling, thinning, pruning, 
planting and harvesting. For the revenue generation, we asked the amount of total revenue 
collected by the CFUGs per unit area of the forest in 2008/2009 fiscal year. The main 
source of revenue comes from selling the timber. Additional sources of income are the 
sales of firewood, non-timber forest products such as herbs, and non-forestry income such 
as donations and punishment fees.     
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 In this study, we consider that the timing of handover of the forest use rights to the 
community is endogenously determined by CFUGs. Based on informal interviews with a 
large number of CFUG committee members, we assume that the effective or intensive 
community management was launched in the year of the handover. We use a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) model to deal with the endogeneity problem associated with the year 
of handover. The econometric specification expressing the determinants of forest 
conditions, management intensity and revenue generation is assumed to take the following 
form:  
 
Forest_Condition, Forest_Management or Revenue i =  +Hand_Overi + Xi +  ,      
(1) 
 
where Hand_Overi is the year when the forest was handed over to the community i, is an 
error term. As discussed in detail earlier, Forest_Conditioni is proxied by the following set 
of variables: i) the percentage of barren, planted and encroached areas, ii) the volume of 
mature trees per hectare, iii) the number of pole trees per hectare, and iv) the number of 
small trees per hectare. Forest_ Managementi, is measured by the percentage of managed 
forest area during the last 5 years from the data collection date, and Revenue by the amount 
of revenue generation per hectare of forest area by the CFUGs in the fiscal year 2009/2010, 
as mentioned earlier. Xi is a vector of the characteristics of the community forest which 
include physical characteristics of the forests such as the area of the forests, distance to 
road, distance to the forest from the village center, the slope of the forests, and 
demographics such as the number of households per unit of forest area and the total number 
of households involved in the community forestry. We incorporate the year of latest 
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operational plan submission in the model as an explanatory variable in order to control for 
the effects of the timing of the data collection on forest conditions and management 
activities. In the regression equations of management and revenue, we also include the 
characteristics of the president (age, sex, and education level) of the CFUG committee as 
explanatory variables to control for the effect of his/her attributes in the forest management 
and revenue generation. Since presidents change frequently, we do not include these 
variables in the equations for forest conditions, which are stock variables.  
The regression equation for the determinants of the timing of the forest handover, in 
turn, is assumed to take the following form: 
 
Hand_Overi =  + Zi + Xi + i ,                                                                         (2) 
 
where I is an error term. Identification of the coefficient on Handover () requires 
instrumental variables (Zi) that are correlated with the timing of the forest handover but do 
not directly affect forest conditions. Our identification assumption is that the timing of the 
handover is affected by the accessibility to the forest offices and the foresters’ workloads. 
As Edmonds (2002) argues, while foresters do not directly participate in the management 
of forests, they play a decisive role in the process of the handing over of the forest use 
rights to the local communities (including its timing). In the process of handing over, 
foresters help the community people in a number of ways from the formation of the 
community user groups to the handing-over decision. The handing-over process is quite 
time consuming and tedious since the transaction cost is very high in the group formation 
and collective decision making. The foresters have to go repeatedly to the forests and 
villages, and need to be involved in activities like group formation, assembly meeting, 
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forest inventory measurement, and the preparation of the constitution and the operational 
plan. Therefore, the foresters might prefer to be involved first in the handing-over to those 
forests which are easily accessible from the forest offices. Moreover, the handing-over 
decision may also depend on the workload of the foresters. If the forest offices have to 
cover a large area, the average handing-over rate of the forest is likely to be comparatively 
low. Based on those arguments, the year of hand-over is instrumented by the time taken to 
reach range posts from the forest border (foresters’ accessibility) and the total forest area 
covered by the corresponding range post (foresters’ workload). We estimate the regression 
functions by using the 2SLS model. 
  
5. Estimation results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics and first-stage regression results 
For expository purposes, we divide the samples into two groups by the median year of 
handover (on or before 1998 and after 1998) and examine the difference in the means of 
the variables used in the regression analyses between the two groups using the t-test. Since 
some data are missing, the sample sizes are different for different items. As shown in Table 
1, for which data were collected from October 2010 to December 2010, difference is 
significant in the percentage of deforested area suggesting that severely deforested forests 
were handed-over earlier. Table 2 exhibits the difference in the mean of the explanatory 
variables. The mean differences are significant in the distance to road, slope of the forest, 
time taken to reach range post, and area covered by the range post. That is, the forests, 
which were handed-over earlier, are located in flat places, near from the road and the range 
posts, and intensively covered by the foresters. 
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  Table 3 presents the first-stage regression results where the year of handover is the 
dependent variable. The coefficients of the instruments are positively significant in the 
first-stage regression results regardless of changes in sample size and specifications, 
suggesting that the larger the area covered by the range post and the longer the time taken 
to reach the forest from the range post, the later was the year of the forest handed-over. The 
F-statistics for testing the significance of the excluded instruments are equal to or well 
above 10 in all equations, suggesting that the problem of weak instruments is not of 
concern (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In the test of the over identifying restriction, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are correlated with the error term in 
all first-stage regressions.
7
   
5.2. Determinants of deforestation and forest degradation 
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the regression equations explaining the percentage 
of deforested area in the forests and the volume of the mature trees. We show two 
regression results with slightly different specifications. In the second model, we include the 
slope of the forests as an additional explanatory variable, which contains 14 missing 
observations, leading to a smaller sample size.  
 The coefficient of population pressure, measured by the number of households per 
unit of forest area, is positive and significant when the dependent variable is the percentage 
of deforested area in the community forests. This clearly supports hypothesis 1 that 
population pressure is a key factor explaining deforestation before the handover. The 
coefficient of the total forest area is negatively significant indicating that the proportion of 
severely degraded forest area is smaller in larger forests. When the dependent variable is 
                                                          
7 The reduced form results are available upon request. The results are consistent with the 
2SLS regression results discussed in the text. 
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the average volume of mature trees per hectare, the coefficient of the distance to the main 
road is positively significant in the second model (i.e., with the slope of the forests 
included). This indicates that favorable road access contributes to the loss of mature trees 
because it facilitates the transportation of timber to distant markets where the demand for 
timber is high. Note that unlike the case of severe deforestation, felling of some mature 
trees might have taken place after the handover. If repeated cutting and grazing are 
prevented, the regeneration of new trees can take place in those places where mature trees 
were cut down. Therefore, under ordinary conditions, the harvesting of mature trees does 
not lead to deforestation but only to short-term forest degradation. It is worth emphasizing 
that the determinants of deforestation due to grazing and the expansion of agricultural land 
and those of forest degradation due to the felling of large mature trees are quite different. 
These findings support hypothesis 1. 
 One should note that the year of handover is insignificant in all the cases (i.e., both 
models and both dependent variables) reported in Table 4. These results indicate that 
deforestation and the loss of mature trees were not affected by the community forest 
management initiated 12 years earlier on average because many more years are needed to 
grow large mature trees. 
5.3 Determinants of management intensity and revenue generation 
Table 5 presents the second-stage regression results for the percentage of area where the 
management operation was carried out as well as for the revenue generation per hectare 
under community management. The estimated coefficients of household density are 
positively significant in both regression equations, which is in sharp contrast with the 
results on deforestation. These results together suggest that the large demand for forest land 
and for tree resources induced by population pressure contributes to the deforestation when 
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the forest is open access under government management but intensifies the management 
activities and generates more revenue per unit area once the user rights are handed over to 
the local community. The higher the demand for forest products, the more resources are 
extracted from the forests, resulting in more revenue generation. Moreover, the coefficient 
of distance to the road is negatively significant in the equation for the percentage of the 
management area, which indicates that people manage forests intensively in forests near 
roads. These results support the validity of hypothesis 2.  
Contrary to hypothesis 2, however, the coefficient of distance to the road is not 
significant in the equation for the revenue per hectare. Recall that favorable road access 
contributes to the loss of mature trees according to the analysis of the volume of mature 
trees reported in Table 4. So far as selling harvested timber is a major source of revenue, 
these estimation results suggest that mature timber trees were harvested in areas with better 
market access primarily before handover of forest use rights when the forests were under 
government management. 
The coefficient of the area of the forest is negative and significant in the equation 
for the percentage of the managed area, suggesting the high cost of managing large forest 
areas. In addition, the coefficient of the distance to the village is negatively significant in 
the equation for revenue per hectare, suggesting that CFUGs harvest valuable forest 
products such as timber from the nearby forests from the villages. Furthermore, CFUGs 
headed by younger presidents manage forest more intensively and collect more revenue, 
which suggests that younger presidents, who must have longer horizon, would have greater 
interest in managing forests and generating revenue. Moreover, it is interesting to observe 
that CFUGs collect more revenue if the president is female. Although extracting firewood 
and feed grasses from the forest is hard work, traditionally it is women's job in Nepal. Thus, 
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female president of CFUG may have stronger interest in the extraction of forest resources. 
The year of handover has no significant effect on forest management, which may be taken 
to imply that the forest management intensity is independent from the year of handover. On 
the other hand, it has weakly positive effects on the revenue generation. 
5.4. Determinants of reforestation 
As shown in Table 6, the coefficients of the year of handover are positively significant in 
the equation for small trees and negatively significant for pole trees. These findings 
indicate that pole size trees are dominant in the forests which were handed over earlier, 
whereas small size trees are dominant in the recently handed over forests. These results are 
consistent with our argument that CFUGs began to protect and manage the forests 
intensively after the handing-over of the forest use rights and, hence, new trees began to 
regenerate. It is estimated that the diameter of the Sal trees increases by nearly 1cm 
annually under normal conditions at the sapling and seedling stages (Sapkota and Meilby, 
2009). If the trees are properly managed, we expect that a newly regenerated Sal tree can 
graduate to become a pole size tree after 10 years. Since the average age of the CFUGs is 
around 12 years, we can safely infer that newly regenerated trees after the handover have 
become pole trees in the forests handed over earlier than the average age of the CFUG. 
Under the community management regime, grazing and harvesting the fodder are severely 
restricted in most cases. Therefore, we expect that regeneration takes place immediately 
after the forest management began, which increases the number of small trees in newly 
handed-over forests. The regression results support hypothesis 3.   
 It can be also seen that the coefficient of forest area is negatively significant in the 
equation for small trees. This may be due to the higher cost of protection from grazing and 
harvesting in larger forests. Another significant variable is the distance to the road, which is 
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positively significant in the equation for pole trees, but negatively significant in the 
equation for small trees. These results indicate that pole size trees are better preserved in 
remote areas. Small trees generally grow naturally after large trees are harvested because 
they need enough sunlight and space to grow. Therefore, in recent years, CFUGs may 
harvest trees from the nearby portions of the forests from roads. However, this conjecture 
needs further scrutiny, particularly because the distance from road is found to have no 
effect on the revenue. Furthermore, the coefficient of the year of submission of the latest 
operation plan is positively significant in the equation for pole trees because the later the 
year of operation plan submission, the longer the period of regeneration after the year of 
handover.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 A considerable number of studies have attempted to explain the success of 
community forestry in the Hill region of Nepal where non-timber forests dominate 
(Gilmour and Fisher, 1991; Hobley 1996; Tachibana et al., 2001). However, there is 
controversy about the impacts of community management on the timber forests in terms of 
forest conditions, management intensity and income generation. According to Otsuka and 
Place (2001), non-timber forests can be maintained and rehabilitated by preventing the 
excessive extraction of resources, but timber forests need to be managed intensively by 
conducting various management operations such as thinning, pruning, weeding and 
harvesting, in order to produce valuable trees. It is not obvious whether such activities can 
be effectively organized by community management, because the collective management 
may reduce incentives to work. Thus, whether the community forestry is a viable 
mechanism to manage the timber forest is a remaining issue.  
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 Our analysis revealed that the community forestry program had desirable impacts 
on the rehabilitation of the forests. We found that forests handed over earlier contained 
more pole size trees, whereas forests handed over more recently contained more small size 
trees. This evidence clearly indicates that new trees tend to be regenerated after the 
community forest users start to manage the handed-over forests. Furthermore, population 
pressure, measured by the number of households per unit of forest area, not only fostered 
the deforestation in the past when the forests were de facto open access, but also 
contributed to better management and the generation of more revenue per unit area in 
recent years due to the handover of the forest use rights. The results also showed that small 
trees were actively grown in the forests near roads, whereas mature trees were better 
preserved in more distant forests from roads.   
 In short, this study demonstrated that the community forestry program contributed 
to the reforestation, intensive forest management, and income generation in the forest 
communities with high population pressure and favorable market access. In other words, 
community forest management seems conducive to the sustainable management of timber 
forests with income generation, which is likely to be beneficial for the poor who are 
dependent on forests for their livelihood. Furthermore, to the extent that sustainable timber 
production is profitable, promotion of such forests will contribute to reforestation and, 
hence, carbon sequestration in developing countries. Therefore, a clear policy implication 
of this study is to encourage the development of community-based forest management 
systems for timber forests.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of dependent variables by the timing of handover 
Dependent variables 
On and 
before 
1998 
No. of 
Obs. 
After 
1998 
No. of 
Obs. 
Difference 
(t-statistics) 
Small Trees (mean # per ha) 12370 116 11617 73 760 (0.58) 
Pole Trees (mean # per ha) 936 116 879 73 57 (0.66) 
Mature Trees (mean volume 
per ha) 
124 107 125 67 -.8 (-.05) 
% Deforested Area 1.5 107 0.9 67 -.6* (-1.94) 
% Managed Area 40.6 114 37.5 65 3 (0.651) 
Revenue  (Rs per ha) 1568 114 1878 65 -310 (-.50) 
 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics of independent variables by the timing of handover 
Independent variables 
On and 
before  
1998 
No. of 
Observations. 
After 
1998 
No. of 
Observations 
 
 
Difference         
(t-statistics) 
Household density 1.5 126 1.2 75 .36 (1.46) 
      
Forest area (1,000 ha) 2.9 126 3.4 75 -.45 (-1.15) 
Distance to road (km) 5.7 126 7.7 75 -1.98***(-2.39) 
Distance to village 
(km) 
0.6 126 0.6 75 
-.05 (-.52) 
Year of latest 
Operation Plan 
submitted 
2007 126 2007 75 -.41 (-1.40) 
Slope of forest (degree) 11 117 15.5 66 -3.99*** (-3.18) 
Time taken to reach 
range post (minutes) 
1.6 126 2.2 75 .59*** (-5.69) 
Area under range post 
(km
2
) 
123.4 126 208.2 75 -84.77*** (-4.66) 
Age of president of 
CFUG 
43.0 126 42.3 75 .68 (.45) 
 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.   
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 3.  First-stage regression of the year of handover
1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Household 
density  
-0.085 
(-0.649) 
-0.026 
(-0.201) 
0.069 
(0.499) 
0.128 
(0.927) 
-0.071 
(-0.599) 
-0.00 
(-0.002) 
Area of forest  
0.037 
(0.495) 
0.051 
(0.685) 
0.073 
(0.957) 
0.073 
(0.946) 
0.00 
(0.003) 
0.026 
(0.343) 
Distance  to 
road  
0.00 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(-0.437) 
0.012 
(0.321) 
0.011 
(0.282) 
-0.015 
(-0.425) 
-0.027 
(-0.748) 
Distance to 
village  
0.405 
(1.409) 
0.461 
(1.631) 
0.469* 
(1.664) 
0.458 
(1.614) 
0.449 
(1.527) 
0.469 
(1.59) 
Year latest OP  
0.147 
(1.557) 
0.138 
(1.471) 
0.078 
(0.837) 
0.071 
(0.754) 
0.122 
(1.281) 
0.102 
(1.06) 
Education 1 of  
president 
a
    
-0.975** 
(-2.427) 
-0.818** 
(-1.976) 
  
Education 2 of  
president 
a
    
-0.987 
(-1.435) 
-0.774 
(-1.085) 
  
Female president 
dummy    
0.162 
(0.261) 
0.018 
(0.028) 
  
Age of the 
president   
-0.01 
(-0.492) 
-0.022 
(-0.974) 
  
Time taken to 
reach Range 
Post   
0.943*** 
(3.411) 
0.987*** 
(3.541) 
0.944*** 
(3.285) 
0.930*** 
(3.168) 
0.902*** 
(3.231) 
0.900*** 
(3.151) 
Area under 
Range Post   
0.004*** 
(2.909) 
0.004*** 
(2.966) 
0.004** 
(2.391) 
0.004** 
(2.419) 
0.005*** 
(2.857) 
0.005*** 
(2.919) 
Slope of forest 
 
 
 
0.050** 
(2.071) 
 
 
0.026 
(1.05) 
 
 
0.048* 
(1.94) 
Constant 
 
1699.5*** 
(8.962) 
1716.6*** 
(9.102) 
1838.3*** 
(9.785) 
1852.5*** 
(9.775) 
1749.9 
*** 
(9.142) 
1789.9 
*** 
(9.277) 
N 174 160 179 165 189 173 
F 6.221 6.239 4.690 4.236 5.418 5.172 
R-squared 0.207 0.248 0.236 0.250 0.173 0.201 
F_excluded 15.524 14.712 11.905 13.634 14.613 10.962 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.   
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Predicted values of the year of handover in equations (1) and (2) are used for the second-stage regressions of 
deforestation and timber volumes, in equations (3) and (4) for management intensity and revenue per ha, and in 
equations (5) and (6) for the number of small and poll trees per ha.  
a. Education 1 and 2 refer to secondary and tertiary education, respectively. 
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Table 4. Determinants of deforestation and the number of mature trees: second-stage estimation 
 
Sample size=174 Sample size=160 
 Deforestation Mature  trees Deforestation Mature  trees 
Household density 
  
0.299*** 
(2.957) 
-3.363 
(-0.588) 
0.296*** 
(2.848) 
-1.588 
(-0.303) 
Area of forest 
  
-0.106* 
(-1.892) 
2.501 
(0.788) 
-0.105* 
(-1.735) 
1.222 
(0.399) 
Distance  to road 
  
-0.029 
(-1.145) 
2.199 
(1.53) 
-0.017 
(-0.619) 
2.791** 
(1.987) 
Distance to village 
  
0.054 
(0.254) 
-11.588 
(-0.956) 
-0.025 
(-0.109) 
-14.952 
(-1.293) 
Year of latest 
operation plan 
  
-0.028 
(-0.371) 
4.886 
(1.155) 
-0.042 
(-0.518) 
5.21 
(1.285) 
Year of handover 
  
-0.039 
(-0.291) 
-6.00 
(-0.785) 
-0.007 
(-0.044) 
-0.584 
(-0.080) 
Slope of forest 
  
 
 
 
 
-0.03 
(-1.426) 
-0.938 
(-0.887) 
Constant 
  
135.5 
(0.512) 
2293.1 
(0.153) 
100.0 
(0.329) 
-9170.9 
(-0.647) 
F-statistics 4.168 0.819 3.647 1.037 
 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.   
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Determinants of management operation and revenue generation: second-stage 
estimation 
 
Sample size=179 Sample size=165 
 
Management 
intensity 
Revenue 
generation 
Management 
intensity 
Revenue 
generation 
Household density 
9.647*** 
(6.913) 
912.215*** 
(4.526) 
9.769*** 
(6.659) 
784.920*** 
(3.774) 
Area of forest 
-2.808*** 
(-3.589) 
4.862 
(0.043) 
-2.640*** 
(-3.141) 
-14.924 
(-0.125) 
Distance  to road 
-0.56 
(-1.515) 
-36.071 
(-0.675) 
-0.689* 
(-1.715) 
5.986 
(0.105) 
Distance to village 
2.63 
(0.918) 
-584.378 
(-1.412) 
1.997       
(0.658) 
-768.744* 
(-1.787) 
Year latest op 
-0.504 
(-0.521) 
-91.779 
(-0.656) 
-0.702 
(-0.685) 
-106.944 
(-0.736) 
Education 1 of  
president 
a
 
-0.132 
(-0.028) 
-591.433 
(-0.872) 
1.884       
(0.384) 
-1011.943 
(-1.453) 
Education 2 of  
president 
a
 
4.474 
(0.632) 
-138.695 
(-0.136) 
7.216       
(0.937) 
-305.033 
(-0.280) 
Female president 
dummy 
3.600 
(0.574) 
1742.385* 
(1.924) 
4.279 
(0.638) 
1902.121** 
(2.001) 
Age of the president 
-0.371* 
(-1.744) 
-84.892*** 
(-2.765) 
-0.248 
(-1.016) 
-84.028** 
(-2.425) 
Year of handover 
1.141 
(0.608) 
426.206 
(1.572) 
1.694 
(0.830) 
53.371 
(1.567)      
Slope of forest 
 
 
 
 
0.203 
(0.739) 
      -112.324*** 
(-2.889)                 
Constant 
-1.21E+03 
(-0.311) 
-6.62E+05 
(-1.175) 
-1929.213 
(-0.459) 
-6.85E+05 
(-1.149) 
F-statistics 9.944 
 
4.444915 7.962 4.465024 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.   
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
a. Education 1 and 2 refer to secondary and tertiary education, respectively. 
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Table 6. Determinants of the number of small and pole trees per hectare: second-stage estimation 
 
Sample size=189 Sample size=173 
 
Small trees Pole trees Small Trees Pole Trees 
Household 
density  
-294.966 
(-0.637) 
-42.399 
(-1.411) 
-514.646 
(-1.172) 
-36.188 
(-1.195) 
Area of forest  
-529.816* 
(-1.861) 
-20.143 
(-1.091) 
-544.768* 
(-1.881) 
-19.11 
(-0.953) 
Distance  to road  
-465.528*** 
(-3.610) 
16.836** 
(2.013) 
-467.029*** 
(-3.567) 
13.879 
(1.532) 
Distance to 
village  
-951.887 
(-0.851) 
93.453 
(1.288) 
-950.774 
(-0.857) 
95.323 
(1.244) 
Year of latest 
operation plan  
508.818 
(1.34) 
56.178** 
(2.281) 
558.945 
(1.49) 
54.815** 
(2.126) 
Year of handover  
2189.414*** 
(3.087) 
-113.486** 
(-2.466) 
1767.569** 
(2.247) 
-119.753** 
(-2.437) 
Slope of forest  
 
 
 
 
-37.498 
(-0.369) 
8.771 
(1.266) 
Constant  
-5.38e+06 *** 
(-3.794) 
1.15E+05 
(1.249) 
-4.63e+06 *** 
(-3.027) 
1.30E+05 
(1.326) 
F-statistics 4.050 2.524 3.057 1.983 
 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.   
T-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
